University of Cincinnati College of Law

University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and
Publications
Faculty Articles and Other Publications

College of Law Faculty Scholarship

1999

Attorney-Client Privilege When the Client is a
Public Official: Litigating the Opening Act of the
Impeachment Drama
Timothy K. Armstrong
Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law, timothy.armstrong@uc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/fac_pubs
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Courts Commons, Law and Politics Commons,
President/Executive Department Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons
Recommended Citation
Armstrong, Timothy K., "Attorney-Client Privilege When the Client is a Public Official: Litigating the Opening Act of the
Impeachment Drama" (1999). Faculty Articles and Other Publications. 349.
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/fac_pubs/349

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law Faculty Scholarship at University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship
and Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles and Other Publications by an authorized administrator of University of
Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information, please contact ken.hirsh@uc.edu.

bite
Collar
Crime
1999

A Publication of the American Bar Association
Center for Continuing Legal Education
and the
Criminal Justice Section

Defending Liberty
Pursuing Justice

Attorney-Client Privilege When the Client is a Public Official

A-1

Attorney-Client Privilege ·when the Client is a Public Official:
Litigating the Opening Act of the Impeachment Drama
W. Nei I Eggleston*
Timothy K. Armstrong=I=
Howrey & Simon
Washington, DC
The divided panel decision of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in /n re Lindsey,
158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 466 (1998), 1 represented a dramatic shift in
that court's thinking on the question whether the
attorney-client privilege protects what a government official says to his agency's counsel in confidence. Although the court of appeals in at least
four previous decisions had held that a government agency client holds the same privilege any
other client would under like circumstances to
communicate with counsel in private,2 the
Lindsey court took a quite different view. Where
previously the existence of the attorney-client
privilege turned upon the application of a wellunderstood test (whether the communication
was made in confidence by a client, to an attorney acting as such, for the purpose of seeking
legal advice, and not for the purpose of perpetrating a crime or fraud), the court of appeals
adopted an unusual new formula that differed
from the settled common-law privilege in ·two
significant respects. First, the court of appeals

expressly held that the scope of the attorneyclient privilege may be narrower in criminal
cases than in civil cases when the client is a governmental agency. As discussed below, this
restriction is substantially at odds both with the
Federal Rules of Evidence and the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the common-law attorney-client privilege. Second, the court of appeals
ruled that, in criminal cases, the existence of the
attorney-client privilege depends on the content
of the communication the privilege holder wishes to withhold-specifically, on whether the communication contains "information of possible
criminal offenses." The court of appeals cited no
case, however, to establish that communications
containing "information of possible criminal
offenses" lay outside the privilege's protection
when made in confidence within an otherwise
proper attorney-client relationship.
Although both parties petitioned for certiorari, 3
the Supreme Court, with two Justices dissenting,
declined to hear the case. The dissenters saw
Lindsey as the last best chance to resolve the
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the Lindsey decision in context, however, we
offer this brief summary of the events most
salient. to the privilege dispute.
At his request, Independent Counsel Kenneth
Starr's jurisdiction was expanded in January 1998
. so that he could explore "whether Monica
Lewinsky or others"-there was never any doubt
that "or others" meant the President-"suborned
perjury, obstructed justice, intimidated witnesses,
or otherwise violated federal law[.] "4 Armed with
this expansive jurisdictional grant and the subpoena power of a federal grand jury, Starr's
Office of Independent Counsel ("OIC") proceeded directly to the White House Counsel's Office
and demanded the disclosure of confidential
communications between White House attorneys and their client, the President of the United
States. The first attorney to be subpoenaed, who
would ultimately lend his name to the decision
of the court of appeals, was Bruce Lindsey,
Deputy Counsel and Assistant to the President.
Lindsey, an attorney licensed to practice in
Arkansas, was no doubt selected for questioning
because of his long-term friendship with the
President. The OIC later questioned other White
House attorneys before the grand jury, including
Special Counsel Lanny Breuer and Deputy
Counsel Cheryl Mills.
After the OIC subpoenaed him on January 30,
1998, Lindsey testified twice in February 1998,
and again in March 1998, before the grand jury.
On several occasions, prosecutors attempted to
elicit from him the substance of confidential
communications he had had with the President.
As to those questions involving communications
between Lindsey and the President in the course
of his official duties as Deputy White House
Counsel, Lindsey asserted the attorney-client
privilege (and, in some instances, the attorney
work product doctrine) and declined to answer. 5
The OIC moved to compel Lindsey ·to disclose
BACKGROUND
his confidential communications with the
President, and the White House, as holder of the
It may seem unusual to recapitulate the backprivilege at issue, opposed.
ground of a story that has, despite popular
protestations of fatigue, utterly dominated the
national media for upwards of a year. To place

question that had divided the court of appeals
because of the likelihood that the lower court's
decision would effectively keep the issue from
arising again. Because agency counsel could no
longer predict in advance that their communication with their client would be privileged after
Lindsey, the dissenters perceived, those communications would be less likely to occur in the first
place, and thus the question whether their disclosure could be compelled might not readily
arise for litigation. The D.C. Circuit would, in
other words, have the last word on a subject
both parties had recognized was important to the
functioning of the national government as a
whole.
We believe that the decision of the court of
appeals raises troubling questions the majority
opinion failed to recognize or address. The
Lindsey decision makes government agency
lawyers something less than lawyers, for unlike
any other attorney, they cannot communicate
with their client in confidence. In so doing, the
decision creates a perverse incentive for agency
officials to retain private counsel to advise them
on official government matters-counsel who lack
the institutional expertise of agency counsel and
who have sworn no oath to the government. The
consequences of the panel's decision will be felt
over time, and the risks it may pose cannot now
be fully predicted. But the panel's narrowing of
the privilege, its restriction on the privilege in
criminal cases, and its novel content-based test,
all threaten the unique. relationship the law has
long recognized to exist between attorney and
client, and the decision's adverse impact on the
profession as a whole may wel I come to reach
far beyond the particular factual circumstances
in which it originated.

Attorney-Client Privilege When the Client is a Public Official
THE PRIVILEGE ISSUE IN THE DISTRICT COURT

Before the district court, the parties disagreed
over whether the court could make a blanket ruling declaring the privileges at issue applicable or
inapplicable, or whether it had to make an individual ruling on each question and answer over
which the witness asserted a privilege. The White
House argued for an individualized determination, noting that the court of appeals in a previous case involving the presidential communications privilege had ordered the district court to
assess each communication individually to
ensure that no greater disclosure of privileged
material than the law strictly required occurred. 6
This would, no doubt, have involved greater
effort on the district court's part, possibly including an in camera session in which the witness
answered the questions propounded by the OIC,
but it would have ensured that any breach of settled evidentiary privileges held by the executive
branch of government was no broader than necessary. The district court refused, however, to
deal with the questions individually. It refused
even to disclose to counsel for the White House
what questions Lindsey had asserted privilege
over, essentially requiring the White House to
guess what information the OIC claimed to want,
and preventing the White House from establishing the factual predicates for the privilege in any
but the broadest terms. The district court also
entertained two in camera and ex parte submissions proffered by the OIC as establishing the
OIC's need for the testimony it sought to compel.
The district court refused the White House's
request to be allowed to review and respond to
these submissions. Thus, the district court's ruling, when it came, was based on a record the
district court itself had kept at a high level of
generality and which had been developed and
seen by (and presumably slanted to favor) only
one side to the case.
The district court rejected the absolutist position, advanced by the OIC and apparently adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
in a case not involving communications by the
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President with White House Counsel/ that a governmental client held no attorney-client privilege
before a federal grand jury. See In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d 21, 30-32 (D.D.C.
1998). It also rejected the White House's position, however, that the attorney-client privilege,
which in all other contexts is absolute,8 should
remain so when the party claiming the privilege
is the President of the United States. Instead, the
district court took a middle course substantially
similar to one charted in the amitus curiae brief
of the Department of Justice. It ruled that,
although the attorney-client privilege did attach
to communications between the President and
White House Counsel,
[i] n the context of a federal grand jury
investigation where one government
agency needs information from another to determine if a crime has been
committed, the Court finds that the
governmental attorney-client privilege
must be qualified in order to balance
the needs of the criminal justice system against the government agency's
need for confidential legal advice.

Grand jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 32-33.
In the balancing test it constructed, the district
court effectively placed the thumb of the federal
judiciary firmly on the side of what it called the
"needs of the criminal justice system." First, by
refusing to consider on an individualized basis
the questions and answers the OIC claimed to
want, the district court prevented the White
House from establishing "the government
agency's need for confidential legal advice" in
any but the broadest terms. Second, by refusing
to require the OIC to specify to opposing counsel
what information it purportedly needed, but
instead allowing the OIC to proffer showings of
need to the district court ex parte and in camera,
the district court made it all but impossible for
t~e White House to challenge whether "the
needs of the criminal justice system" truly

--~
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required disclosure of the President's attorneyclient confidences. The combined effect of these
. aspects of the district court's decision was and is
one we found quite troubling: instead of requiring .the .President's attorneys to answer only the
questions previously put to them by the OIC, the
district court's opinion gave the OIC broad
license to question opposing counsel within any
of a large number of categories described broadly by the district court, with no mechanism to
ensure that the OIC's questioning stayed within
the bounds of its ex parte proffer of need Within
the categories of information its opinion
described, the district court appeared to leave
only the very low relevancy threshold of United
States v. R. Enterprises, 498 U.S. 292 (1991), as
the standard for challenging any question asked
by the OIC. See Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F.
Supp. 2d at 37-38.

THE PRIVILEGE ISSUE IN THE COURT OF

APPEALS

After litigating the OIC's attempt to obtain
direct Supreme Court review of the district
court's judgment, the parties were given an expedited schedule for briefing and argument in the
court of appeals. The White House appealed the
district court's order compelling attorney Lindsey
to disclose to the grand jury his confidential
communications with the President. The OIC did
not cross-appeal.
On appeal, the White House argued that the
district court had erred in departing from the settled authorities holding the attorney-client privilege absolute and not subject to the balancing
test formulated by the court below. The White
House attacked the rationales the district court
advanced to justify why the settled absolute common-law privilege should not apply in the face
of the OIC's grand jury subpoena.
The White House first surveyed the authorities
providing that governmental clients, like all other
clients, hold a privilege against compelled disclosure of their confidential communications
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with counsel. On this point, courts and commentators alike have reached a broad consensus that
. a government agency could be a "client" for purposes of applying the attorney-client privilege.
The general rule was sufficiently settled to earn
itself a place in the new Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers, which provides that "the
attorney-client privilege normally applies to government agencies as to other organizations as
provided in [the corporate setting]" in light of
"the generally prevailing rule that governmental
agencies and agents enjoy the same privileges as
non-governmental
counterparts."
See
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers§ 124 cmt. a (1998). As in the context of
a corporate client, applying the privilege when
the client was a government agency served a
public purpose in "aid[ing] government entitie·s
and officers in obtaining legal advice founded on
a complete and accurate factual picture."
Restatement§ 124 cmt. b.
The Supreme Court, too, had recognized that
government agencies could be "clients" for purposes of applying the attorney-client privilege. In
promulgating what later became the Federal
Rules of Evidence, the Supreme Court's Proposed
Rule 503, dealing with the attorney-client privilege, defined "client" to include a "public officer
... or other organization or entity, either public
or private." Although Congress rejected Proposed
Rule 503 in favor of Rule 501 's general direction
to look to the common law in matters of privilege, the proposed rules have nevertheless been
generally well regarded as accurate statements of
principle. See, e.g., 2 Stephen A. Saltzburg et al.,
Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 589 (6th ed.
1994) ("[m]ost importantly, the proposed rule
covering the attorney-client privilege is still at
this point a generally reliable statement of federal common law."). 9
Even more significantly, at least four previous
decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit had expressly ruled that a governmental client, like any other client, held a valid
privilege to communicate with agency counsel
in confidence. 10 The D.C. Circuit's most through
discussion of the issue came in its opinion in
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Mead Data Central v. Department of the Air
Force, 566 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Mead Data
Central involved Exemption 5 of the Freedom of
Information Act ("FOIA"), which essentially
exempts privileged matter from FOIA's disclosure
requirements. This exemption, the court of
appeals held, protected an agency's attorneycl ient confidences from compel led disclosure.
The court's rationale in part tracked the traditional justification given for the application of the
attorney-client privilege when the client is an
organizational entity, but added to it the notion
that candid intra-ag~ncy communications were
essential to good government:
Exemption five is intended to protect the quality of agency decision-making by preventing the
disclosure requirement of the FOIA from cutting
off the flow of information to agency decisionmakers .... The opinion of even the finest attorney, however, is no better than the information
which his client provides. In order to ensure that
a client receives the best possible legal advice,
based on a full and frank discussion with his
attorney, the attorney-client privilege assures him
that confidential communications to his attorney
will not be disclosed without his consent. We
see no reason why this same protection should
not be extended to an agency's communications
with its attorneys under exemption five.
Mead Data Central, 566 F.2d at 252.
The White House also took issue with a statute
on which the district court relied, 28 U.S.C.
§ 535(b), to support its holding that the attorneyclient privilege is only a qualified privilege when
the client is a.government agency. That statute
requires any federal "department or agency" to
report to the Attorney General "[a]ny information, allegation, or complaint" that a government
employee may have committed a federal crime.
Although the White House routinely complied
with this provision as a matter of policy, it noted
that, by its terms, the statute did not apply to the
White House, which was neither a "department"
nor an "agency" of the federal government. 11
Even aside from the literal statutory text, however, the White House also noted the longstanding
interpretation of the Department of Justice that
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section 535(b) should be read to conform with,
rather than to displace, the common-law attorney-client privilege of a governmental client. 12
The White House also attacked the effect of
the district court's ruling on the balance of powers among the three branches, noting the incongruity inherent in allowing an Independent
Counsel-who was held to be an "inferior officer"
of the executive branch in Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654 (1988)-to compel a higher officer
in the Executive Branch hierarchy to disclose his
confidential communications with counsel. This
was an especially troubling consequence in light
of the Independent Counsel's statutory duty to
refer to the Congress any evidence of potentially
impeachable offenses, a duty the OIC has since
exercised and which was plainly in the planning
stages at the time of the argument in the court of
appeals. The White House argued, and the
Attorney General in an amicus brief agreed, that
the White House would be absolutely privileged
to refuse to disclose its attorney-client confidences to Congress under fundamental separation-of-powers principles. Yet, the Independent
Counsel statute set up a mechanism by which
Congress could effectively end-run this fundamental separation of powers principle. Under the
district court's interpretation, Congress could delegate to an inferior executive officer a power
Congress could not itself possess-the power, with
the aid of the federal judiciary, to compel a
President to divulge his confidential communications with counsel, and then to disclose those
communications to Congress in turn. Finally, the
White House took issue with the district court's
refusal to evaluate each question and answer
individually in determining whether the privilege
applied, rather than issuing a blanket ruling as to
broadly described "categories" of testimony the
OIC might wish to seek.
Although widely and erroneously reported in
the popular press as evidence of a rift between
the Attorney General and the President, the
Department of Justice submitted an amicus brief
in the court of appeals that strongly supported
the White House's position and opposed the
position of the OIC. Contrary to the OIC's posi-

~·I
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tion, the Justice Department took the view that
(1) a governmental client holds a valid attorneyclient privilege to refuse to divulge its communications with counsel, even in the face of a grand
jury subpoena; (2) the statute on which the district court relied, 28 U.S.C. § 535(b), was irrelevant to the Lindsey dispute; (3) the district court's .
procedures, calling for blanket disclosure of any
communications within a number of broadly
phrased categories, did not adequately protect
the privileged communications at issue and did
not suffice to inform the witnesses just what testimony they had been compelled to give; and (4)
the district court's judgment should be reversed
and remanded for further consideration under
appropriate standards. The sole area of principled disagreement between the Justice
Department and counsel for the White House
was on the question whether the attorney-client
privilege both agreed to exist should, in the
instant context, be a qualified or an absolute
privilege. The Justice Department believed that a
governmental client ordinarily should hold only
a qualified privilege to communicate with counsel, although it proposed a very stringent standard whereby such communications would be
ordered disclosed only if "essential to justice" in
a particular case. The Justice Department agreed
that the President would retain an absolute privilege vis-a-vis Congress in impeachment proceedings, but took no position on the question
whether the prospect of an imminent impeachment referral from the OIC to Congress altered
the calculus in favor of an absolute privilege
before the grand jury. The White House maintained that the common law knew only one type
of attorney-client privilege, and that privilege
was absolute, and should remain so irrespective
of context.
The court of appeals ruled for the OIC.
Indeed~ although the OIC did not cross-appeal or
otherwise complain about the district court's
judgment, the court of appeals significantly
expanded the ruling in the OIC's favor. Rejecting
the district court's conclusion that even a qualified attorney-client privilege could protect a
President's confidential consultations with White
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House Counsel, the court of appeals instead
ruled that no attorney-client privilege could
apply in the face of a grand jury subpoena if the
. communications sought "contain information of
possible criminal offenses." Lindsey, 158 F.3d at
1266.
The court of appeals recognized that previrn,.is
cases had established that a governmental client
could assert an attorney-client privilege that was
"rather absolute in civil· litigation," but declared
that "those cases do not necessarily control the
application of the privilege here." Lindsey, 158
F.3d at 1271. To support this rationale, it would
have been most natural for the court of appeals
to cite cases holding that the common-law attorney-client privilege applied differently in criminal cases than in civil cases. But it did not do so,
for the eminently practical reason that no such
authorities exist. Instead, the court of appeals
took a circuitous route from its conclusion
through its supporting rationale, ultimately opining that its vision of "the proper allegiance of the
government lawyer," id. at 1273, did not include
the lawyer asserting evidentiary privileges against
an Independent Counsel.
The court of appeals' conception of the "proper allegiance" of a government attorney was constructed from several unrelated sources. It first
extolled "reason and experience, duty, and tradition," Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 12 72, authorities that
need not rely for their intellectual force on the
occasionally inconvenient duty to cite precedent. The court of appeals noted that each attorney's oath to uphold the constitution included a
duty to breach his client's confidences if questioned before a grand jury. id. at 1272-73. The
panel majority also cited, with somewhat greater
force, the public interest in rooting out wrongdoing within the government, tacitly evoking the
Nixonian parallel so forcefully pressed by the
OIC. See id. at 1273-74. Next, although
acknowledging that 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) ·"does· not
clearly· apply to the Office of the President," id.
at 12 74, the court nevertheless read the statute to
"suggest"-a proposition the generality of which
makes it scarcely refutable-that government
lawyers "are duty-bound not to withhold evi-
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dence of federal crimes." Id. The court of appeals
also collected a few examples of presidential
lawyers, including lawyers for the Clinton
Administration, volunteering evidence to various
bodies without raising a claim of attorney-client
privilege. Id. at 1274-75.
The court of appeals rejected the notion that
its rule would unduly chill communications
between government agencies and their counsel,
finding that the clients need only fear disclosure
if their "communications reveal information
relating to possible criminal wrongdoing,"
Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1276, and suggesting that
the President's circumstance was not so different
from that of a corporate officer trying to conceal
an attorney-client communication from a shareholder of the corporation. Id. It then declared
that government officials who felt themselves
"chilled" could always exercise the option of
retaining and consulting private lawyers. Id.
The court of appea]s similarly found unpersuasive the notion that the prospect of impending
impeachment proceedings in Congress supported a stronger privilege for the President's consultations with counsel. It found the duties of White
House Counsel in such a then-unusual context to
be "far from settled," id. at 1277, and found this
uncertainty to weigh against the claim of privilege. The majority similarly brushed aside the
separation of powers argument, essentially
declaring that it was for Congress to choose
whether it wished to recognize a President's
assertion of privilege in impeachment proceedings. See id. at 1277-78. The court of appeals
closed by noting that a President had only a
qualified executive privilege to confer with nonattorney advisors. Again citing no precedent, the
majority opined that "we do not believe that
lawyers are more important to the operations of
government than all other officials, or that the
advice lawyers render is more crucial to the
functioning of the Presidency that the advice
coming from all other quarters." Id. at 12 78.
Because the President could rely only on a qualified privilege to shield his communications with
a junior policy advisor, the panel majority reasoned, he cou Id not expect any privilege to
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attach to his confidential communications with
White House Counsel.
Judge Tatel, dissenting, would have applied
the common-law attorney-client privilege to the
case essentially as that privilege had long been
understood: to bar absolutely the compelled disclosure of what the client told his lawyer in confidence. He would have remanded the case for
additional fact-finding on the question whether
Lindsey was in fact supplying legal advice at the
time of the relevant communications, a question
rendered difficult to answer on appeal by the district court's refusal to perform an individualized
analysis of each question to which the OIC
sought to compel an answer. See Lindsey, 158
F.3d at 1288-89.

ASSESSING THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION

With the Supreme Court's denials of certiorari,
the decision of the Court of Appeals in Lindsey
stands as the most recent authoritative pronouncement on the expectation of confidentiality a government officer enjoys when conferring
with governmental counsel on official matters.
As the justices who dissented from the denial of
certiorari saw it, the court of appeals' decision
could itself chill the very attorney-client communications that could again bring the case to the
Supreme Court for review, requiring in essence
that the Court act now or not at all. See Office of
the President v. Office of Independent Counsel,
119 S. Ct. 466, 466 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari). Given this legitimate
concern, it is pertinent to assess the import of the
Lindsey decision on the attorney-client privilege
for government clients and others. We believe
the decision portends serious potential trouble
for future Presidents of any party, whose ability
to perform the many duties reposed in them by
the Constitution and federal statutes may be seriously hampered by the inability to obtain the
candid and informed legal advice that would be
available to any other citizen or corporation. The
panel majority's decision leaves a number of
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troubling questions unanswered, and pays scant
notice to the role and function of the President in
our system of shared and divided powers.
The difficulties with the court of appeals' opinion can broadly be grouped into "common-law"
and "constitutional" categories. On the first front,
there is ample reason to doubt that the court of
appeals' decision represents a correct interpretation of the common-law authorities supporting
the attorney-client privilege. These flaws in the
court of appeals' analysis should concern all
practitioners alike and are not confinec:f to the
special case of communications between the
President of the United States and White House
Counsel. The second category consists of more
fundamental, although arguably more ephemeral, effects the panel majority's decision may portend for the constitutional separation of powers.
These separation-of-powers concerns can hardly
be dismissed as speculative, although the court
of appeals gave them short shrift.
Turning first to the question whether the court
of appeals correctly applied the common-law of
attorney-client privilege, the panel majority's
decision raises a number of troubling issues that
may confront future counsel in the course of
privilege disputes. First, the court of appeals
breathed new life into a doctrine the Supreme
Court had taken pains to extinguish only a
month .before Lindsey: specifically, the notion
that the scope of the attorney-client privilege
expands and contracts depending on whether
the client claims it in a civil or criminal proceeding. The year before, in In re Sealed Case, 124
F.3d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1997), a different panel of the
court of appeals (again over the dissent of Judge
Tatel) had ruled that the common-law rule providing for the survival of the attorney-client privilege after the client's death should not apply in
criminal cases. See id. at 234 (identifying "a discrete realm (use in criminal proceedings after the
death of the client) where the privilege should
not automatically apply"). The Supreme Court
reversed the court of appeals' decision, ruling in
the process that "there is no case authority for
the proposition that the [attorney-client] privilege
applies differently in criminal and civil cases[.]"
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Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct.
2081, 2087 (1998). The Court reasoned as follows:
[A] client may not know at the time he
discloses information to his attorney
whether it will later be relevant to a
civil or criminal matter, let alone
whether it will be of substantial importance. Balancing ex post the importance of the information against client
interests, even limited to criminal
cases, introduces substantial uncertainty into the privilege's application.
For just that reason, we have rejected
the use of a balancing test in defining
the contours of the privilege.

Id. The Supreme Court's decision in Swidler &
Berlin stands for the proposition that uniform
application of the attorney-client privilege in
civil and criminal cases alike is necessary to provide the client with the ex ante assurance of confidentiality necessary to encourage candor.
The court of appeals in Lindsey, however,
returned to exactly the same ground as the In re
Sealed Case panel of the year before. Although it
recognized the
body
of precedents
"recogniz[ing] a government attorney-client privilege that is rather absolute in civil litigation/'
Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1271, it held that "those
cases do not necessarily control the application
of the privilege here." Id. It then proceeded to
hold that no privilege attached in criminal cases
to communications containing "information of
possible criminal offenses."
It seems clear, however, that the court of
appeals' reinvigorated distinction between criminal and civil cases can only have the adverse
consequences that led the Supreme Court to
reject such a distinction in Swidler & Berlin. Like
any other client, a government officer lacks the
gift of prescience that would be necessary to
"know at the time he discloses information to his
attorney whether it will later be relevant to a civil
or criminal matter," Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct.
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at 2087. Nor, given the wide-ranging and everexpanding scope of a potential independent
counsel inquiry, can it be predicted with any certainty in advance whether a future prosecutor
might believe that any given communication
might "contain information of possible criminal
offenses," as would suffice to overcome the protection of the privilege under the Lindsey rule.
Because it cannot be known in advance whether
any individual attorney-client communication
might later be sought in civil or criminal proceedings, the wisest course for a client concerned about possible disclosure will be not to
communicate with counsel. The court of appeals
dismissed this potential chilling effect, we
believe unwisely. Government attorneys, like all
attorneys, serve their clients best when possessed
of all the relevant facts, and any rule that motivates clients to withhold potentially crucial information from counsel is one the courts should
hesitate to condone. 13
The court of appeals' repeated statements that
whether the attorney-client privilege applies at
all turns on the content of the privileged communications is also troubling. 14 We know of no
authority, and the court of appeals cited none,
that communications containing certain content
fall outside the attorney-client privilege. Rather,
so long as the crime-fraud exception is not implicated, the attorney-client privilege is, and should
be, content-neutral.
The court of appeals' explicit content-based
test raises a number of practical concerns. First, it
is difficult to understand how the content-based
analysis would. apply in practice. Suppose a witness invokes the attorney-client privilege before
a grand jury and the prosecution moves to compel the witness to testify. Who determines
whether the witness' answer to the question
"contains information of possible criminal
offenses" and is therefore unprivileged? If the
prosecutor's mere say-so suffices to meet the
court of appeals' content-based test, then the
privilege itself becomes a sham, voidable at will
by any prosecutor at any time.
Or would the court need to concern itself with
the witness' answer at all? The court of appeals
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in Lindsey ordered Lindsey to testify even though
there was no indication in the record that any of
the communications over which he asserted privilege "contain[ed] information of possible criminal offenses." Because the district court did not
conduct an individualized question-by-question
inquiry into the claim of privilege, and did not
require Lindsey to answer any of the OIC's questions in camera, what answers he might have
given but for the claim of privilege were
nowhere to be found in the record, and the court
of appeals could only have been speculating if it
nevertheless believed that his testimony would
have met its content-based test. May a court simply declare that a witness possesses "information
of possible criminal offenses" absent any testimonial support for such a conclusion? The court
of appeals' disposition of Lindsey, although perhaps not its opinion, appears to leave that
prospect very much open.
Judge Tatel's thoughtful dissent touched on
another serious concern, which was also mentioned by the opinion dissenting from the denial
of certiorari. The court of appeals observed that,
although the President may not have confidential
communications with White House Counsel, he
is always free to hire a private lawyer. Lindsey,
158 F.3d at 1276. This ruling can only create a
perverse incentive for public officials to rely on
private counsel for advice on official, but sensitive, matters. Private attorneys, however, may
make poor civil servants. They would necessarily
lack the institutional familiarity with the mission
and operations of the client agency that agency
counsel would provide. Indeed, in sensitive
cases (which occur routinely for counsel representing the White House), officials of the client
agency may be severely restricted by federal law
or other considerations of the public interest
from disclosing al I material facts to a private
attorney. More fundamen~ally, retained private
counsel have no ethical obligation to serve any
interests beyond those of their individual client.
They are not necessarily well suited to advise an
official on what course of action is best for the
agency, branch, or Nation as a whole. Given that
agency counsel exist specifically for the purpose
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of providing legal advice to the agency in the fulfillment of its official functions, a rule discouraging the very communications that agency counsel need to do their jobs effectively seems poorly
attuned to the public interest.
The panel majority's decision in Lindsey also
raises lingering separation-of-powers concerns.
For one, the court of appeals did not seriously
address the argument that Congress could not
use the Independent Counsel to do something
Congress itself could not-to compel the head of a
coordinate branch of government to disclose his
confidential communications with counsel in the
precursor to impeachment proceedings in
Congress. Impeachment is one of the few formal
proceedings expressly provided for in the
Constitution as a core function of government.
Impeachment of a President, or the threat of
impeachment, necessarily involves the single
most direct and cataclysmic confrontation
between the executive and legislative branches
of government known to our constitutional system. The defense against impeachment, as witnessed by the participation of White House
Counsel in the current proceedings in the House
and Senate, represents more than a defense of
the individual occupying the office of President,
but rather a defense of the institution of the
Presidency against the subordination to the legislative branch that would necessarily be entailed
if Presidents could be easily or frequently
removed at the whim of Congress. White House
Counsel have an official duty to their institutional client in such circumstances, a duty that
depends, among other things, on their ability to
confer with the client in confidence.
If Congress ordered a White House lawyer to
divulge his or her communications with the
President in the course of impeachment proceedings and the lawyer refused, it seems probable
that the resulting dispute between the executive
and legislative branches would be ruled nonjusticiable, and the President's lawyer's refusal to
breach the President's confidences would prevail
by default. The court of appeals' decision, however, effectively establishes an end-run around
this constitutional stalemate, for it allows
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Congress to order the Independent Counsel to
obtain the President's attorney-client communications and then disclose them to Congress.
Whether this is an inappropriate or undue incursion by the legislative branch on the confidences
of the executive is a subject for another day; the
point for present purposes is that this is a very
real alteration in the balance of powers between
the branches that went almost entirely unremarked upon by the court of appeals.
The panel majority decision in Lindsey also
raises the question whether the Independent
Counsel is still, as the Supreme Court held him
to be in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988),
an "inferior officer" of the executive branch. The
independent counsel statute essentially grants
the Independent Counsel the powers of the
Attorney General over matters within his jurisdictional grant. Yet, the decision in Lindsey
empowers the Independent Counsel to do something even the Attorney General may not do: to
require a superior constitutional officer to disclose his confidential communications with
counsel. This is a dramatic and sweeping power
and necessarily raises the question whether the
Independent Counsel remains "inferior" to the
President in the Morrison v. Olson constitutional
sense. Indeed, given the comparatively limited
functions ascribed to inferior officers under the
Supreme Court's more recent ruling in Edmond v.
United States, 117 S. Ct. 1573 (1997), Lindsey
appears to raise even more questions about the
constitutionality of the independent counsel
statute than did Morrison itself. These, too, are
questions for another day, but the Lindsey majority's failure even to recognize them bespeaks a
worrisome case of tunnel vision.
Although the conventional wisdom now holds
that the independent counsel statute will not be
renewed upon its expiration later this year, the
conventional wisdom has scored remarkably few
successes during the Lewinsky investigation to
date. The constitutional tension between the
executive and legislative branches that lurks
beneath the surface of the majority's decision in
Lindsey may have ample future opportunities to
recur and be brought to light.
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